His third imperative, disinterestedness , imposes a pattern of institutional control that is intended to curb the effects of personal or ideological motives that individual scientists may have. The fourth imperative, organized scepticism , implies that science allows detached scrutiny of beliefs that are dearly held by other institutions. This is what sometimes brings science into conflicts with religions and ideologies. Merton described these criteria as belonging to the sociology of science, and thus as empirical statements about norms in actual science rather than normative statements about how science should be conducted Merton [] , His criteria have often been dismissed by sociologists as oversimplified, and they have only had limited influence in philosophical discussions on the demarcation issue Dolby ; Ruse Their potential in the latter context does not seem to have been sufficiently explored.
Most authors who have proposed demarcation criteria have instead put forward a list of such criteria. A large number of lists have been published that consist of usually 5—10 criteria that can be used in combination to identify a pseudoscience or pseudoscientific practice. This includes lists by Langmuir [] , Gruenberger , Dutch , Bunge , Radner and Radner , Kitcher , 30—54 , Grove , Thagard , — , Glymour and Stalker , Derksen , , Vollmer , Ruse , — and Mahner Many of the criteria that appear on such lists relate closely to criteria discussed above in Sections 4.
One such list reads as follows:. Some of the authors who have proposed multicriterial demarcations have defended this approach as being superior to any mono-criterial demarcation.
Hence, Bunge , asserted that many philosophers have failed to provide an adequate definition of science since they have presupposed that a single attribute will do; in his view the combination of several criteria is needed.
This would mean that there is a set of features that are characteristic of science, but although every part of science will have some of these features, we should not expect any part of science to have all of them.
Irzik and Nola proposed the use of this approach in science education. However, a multicriterial definition of science is not needed to justify a multicriterial account of how pseudoscience deviates from science.
Even if science can be characterized by a single defining characteristic, different pseudoscientific practices may deviate from science in widely divergent ways. Some forms of pseudoscience have as their main objective the promotion of a particular theory of their own, whereas others are driven by a desire to fight down some scientific theory or branch of science.
The former type of pseudoscience has been called pseudo-theory promotion , and the latter science denial ism Hansson Pseudo-theory promotion is exemplified by homeopathy, astrology, and ancient astronaut theories. Williams Other forms of science denial are relativity theory denial, tobacco disease denial, hiv denialism, and vaccination denialism.
Many forms of pseudoscience combine pseudo-theory promotion with science denialism. However, as practiced today, creationism has a strong focus on the repudiation of evolution, and it is therefore predominantly a form of science denialism.
The most prominent difference between pseudo-theory promotion and science denial is their different attitudes to conflicts with established science. Science denialism usually proceeds by producing false controversies with legitimate science, i. This is an old strategy, applied already in the s by relativity theory deniers Wazeck , — It has been much used by tobacco disease deniers sponsored by the tobacco industry Oreskes and Conway ; Dunlap and Jacques , and it is currently employed by climate science denialists Boykoff and Boykoff ; Boykoff However, whereas the fabrication of fake controversies is a standard tool in science denial, it is seldom if ever used in pseudo-theory promotion.
To the contrary, advocates of pseudosciences such as astrology and homeopathy tend to describe their theories as conformable to mainstream science. The term scepticism skepticism has at least three distinct usages that are relevant for the discussion on pseudoscience. First, scepticism is a philosophical method that proceeds by casting doubt on claims usually taken to be trivially true, such as the existence of the external world. This has been, and still is, a highly useful method for investigating the justification of what we in practice consider to be certain beliefs.
Secondly, criticism of pseudoscience is often called scepticism. This is the term most commonly used by organisations devoted to the disclosure of pseudoscience. Thirdly, opposition to the scientific consensus in specific areas is sometimes called scepticism. Unwillingness to accept strongly supported factual statements is a traditional criterion of pseudoscience.
See for instance item 5 on the list of seven criteria cited in Section 4. It is particularly useful in relation to fact-finding practices that are not parts of science.
Section 2. Generally speaking, conspiracy theories are theories according to which there exists some type of secret collusion for any type of purpose. In practice, the term mostly refers to implausible such theories, used to explain social facts that have other, considerably more plausible explanations.
Many pseudosciences are connected with conspiracy theories. For instance, one of the difficulties facing anti-vaccinationists is that they have to explain the overwhelming consensus among medical experts that vaccines are efficient. This is often done by claims of a conspiracy:. Conspiracy theories have peculiar epistemic characteristics that contribute to their pervasiveness. Keeley In particular, they are often associated with a type of circular reasoning that allows evidence against the conspiracy to be interpreted as evidence for it.
Frankfurt used the term to describe a type of falsehood that does not amount to lying. A person who lies deliberately chooses not to tell the truth, whereas a person who utters bullshit is not interested in whether what s he says is true or false, only in its suitability for his or her purpose. Epistemic relativism is a term with many meanings; the meaning most relevant in discussions on pseudoscience is denial of the common assumption that there is intersubjective truth in scientific matters, which scientists can and should try to approach.
The distinction between science and pseudoscience has no obvious role in epistemic relativism. Some academic epistemic relativists have actively contributed to the promotion of doctrines such as AIDS denial, vaccination denial, creationism, and climate science denial Hansson , Pennock However, the connection between epistemic relativism and pseudoscience is controversial.
Others have denied that epistemic relativism facilitates or encourages standpoints such as denial of anthropogenic climate change or other environmental problems Burningham and Cooper , This convergence of theoretically divergent demarcation criteria is a quite general phenomenon. Philosophers and other theoreticians of science differ widely in their views on what science is. Nevertheless, there is virtual unanimity in the community of knowledge disciplines on most particular issues of demarcation.
There is widespread agreement for instance that creationism, astrology, homeopathy, Kirlian photography, dowsing, ufology, ancient astronaut theory, Holocaust denialism, Velikovskian catastrophism, and climate change denialism are pseudosciences. There are a few points of controversy, for instance concerning the status of Freudian psychoanalysis, but the general picture is one of consensus rather than controversy in particular issues of demarcation. It is in a sense paradoxical that so much agreement has been reached in particular issues in spite of almost complete disagreement on the general criteria that these judgments should presumably be based upon.
This puzzle is a sure indication that there is still much important philosophical work to be done on the demarcation between science and pseudoscience. Philosophical reflection on pseudoscience has brought forth other interesting problem areas in addition to the demarcation between science and pseudoscience.
Examples include related demarcations such as that between science and religion, the relationship between science and reliable non-scientific knowledge for instance everyday knowledge , the scope for justifiable simplifications in science education and popular science, the nature and justification of methodological naturalism in science Boudry et al , and the meaning or meaninglessness of the concept of a supernatural phenomenon.
Several of these problem areas have as yet not received much philosophical attention. The purpose of demarcations 2. Alternative demarcation criteria 4.
Two forms of pseudo-science 6. Some related terms 6. The purpose of demarcations Demarcations of science from pseudoscience can be made for both theoretical and practical reasons Mahner , The demarcation issue is therefore important in practical applications such as the following: Climate policy : The scientific consensus on ongoing anthropogenic climate change leaves no room for reasonable doubt Cook et al.
Pennock Science education : The promoters of some pseudosciences notably creationism try to introduce their teachings in school curricula. Case 1 : A biochemist performs an experiment that she interprets as showing that a particular protein has an essential role in muscle contraction. There is a consensus among her colleagues that the result is a mere artefact, due to experimental error. Case 2 : A biochemist goes on performing one sloppy experiment after the other.
She consistently interprets them as showing that a particular protein has a role in muscle contraction not accepted by other scientists. Case 3 : A biochemist performs various sloppy experiments in different areas. One is the experiment referred to in case 1.
Much of her work is of the same quality. She does not propagate any particular unorthodox theory. The following examples serve to illustrate the difference between the two definitions and also to clarify why clause 1 is needed: A creationist book gives a correct account of the structure of DNA. An otherwise reliable chemistry book gives an incorrect account of the structure of DNA. A creationist book denies that the human species shares common ancestors with other primates.
A preacher who denies that science can be trusted also denies that the human species shares common ancestors with other primates. Alternative demarcation criteria Philosophical discussions on the demarcation of pseudoscience have usually focused on the normative issue, i. One such list reads as follows: Belief in authority : It is contended that some person or persons have a special ability to determine what is true or false. Others have to accept their judgments.
Unrepeatable experiments : Reliance is put on experiments that cannot be repeated by others with the same outcome. Handpicked examples : Handpicked examples are used although they are not representative of the general category that the investigation refers to.
Unwillingness to test : A theory is not tested although it is possible to test it. Disregard of refuting information : Observations or experiments that conflict with a theory are neglected. Built-in subterfuge : The testing of a theory is so arranged that the theory can only be confirmed, never disconfirmed, by the outcome. Explanations are abandoned without replacement. Tenable explanations are given up without being replaced, so that the new theory leaves much more unexplained than the previous one.
Two forms of pseudo-science Some forms of pseudoscience have as their main objective the promotion of a particular theory of their own, whereas others are driven by a desire to fight down some scientific theory or branch of science.
This is often done by claims of a conspiracy: At the heart of the anti-vaccine conspiracy movement [lies] the argument that large pharmaceutical companies and governments are covering up information about vaccines to meet their own sinister objectives. According to the most popular theories, pharmaceutical companies stand to make such healthy profits from vaccines that they bribe researchers to fake their data, cover up evidence of the harmful side effects of vaccines, and inflate statistics on vaccine efficacy.
Jolley and Douglas Conspiracy theories have peculiar epistemic characteristics that contribute to their pervasiveness.
Bibliography Cited Works Agassi, Joseph, Baigrie, B. Bartley III, W. Boykoff, M. Boykoff, Bunge, Mario, The Need for Reconstruction , Amherst, N. Burningham, K. Cooper, Buttel, Frederick H. Taylor, Carlson, Shawn, Cioffi, Frank, Maibach, J. Stuart Carlton, et al. Culver, Roger and Ianna, Philip, Derksen, A. Dolby, R. Dunlap, Riley E. Jacques, Dutch, Steven I, Feleppa, Robert, Fernandez-Beanato, Damian, Frankfurt, Harry G. Fuller, Steve, Gardner, Martin, Gleberzon, William, Glymour, Clark and Stalker, Douglas, Grove , J.
Gruenberger, Fred J. Guldentops, Guy, Hansson, Sven Ove, Hoyninengen-Huene, Paul, The nature of science , Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jolley, Daniel, and Karen M. Indeed, under the assumption that science has this kind of power, one of the problems with pseudo-science is that it gets an unfair credibility boost by so cleverly mimicking the surface appearance of science. The big difference Popper identifies between science and pseudo-science is a difference in attitude. While a pseudo-science is set up to look for evidence that supports its claims, Popper says, a science is set up to challenge its claims and look for evidence that might prove it false.
In other words, pseudo-science seeks confirmations and science seeks falsifications. There is a corresponding difference that Popper sees in the form of the claims made by sciences and pseudo-sciences: Scientific claims are falsifiable -- that is, they are claims where you could set out what observable outcomes would be impossible if the claim were true -- while pseudo-scientific claims fit with any imaginable set of observable outcomes. What this means is that you could do a test that shows a scientific claim to be false, but no conceivable test could show a pseudo-scientific claim to be false.
Sciences are testable, pseudo-sciences are not. So, Popper has this picture of the scientific attitude that involves taking risks: making bold claims, then gathering all the evidence you can think of that might knock them down.
If they stand up to your attempts to falsify them, the claims are still in play. But, you keep that hard-headed attitude and keep you eyes open for further evidence that could falsify the claims. If you decide not to watch for such evidence -- deciding, in effect, that because the claim hasn't been falsified in however many attempts you've made to falsify it, it must be true -- you've crossed the line to pseudo-science. This sets up the central asymmetry in Popper's picture of what we can know.
We can find evidence to establish with certainty that a claim is false. However, we can never owing to the problem of induction find evidence to establish with certainty that a claim is true. So the scientist realizes that her best hypotheses and theories are always tentative -- some piece of future evidence could conceivably show them false -- while the pseudo-scientist is sure as sure as can be that her theories have been proven true.
Of course, they haven't been -- problem of induction again. So, why does this difference between science and pseudo-science matter? As Popper notes, the difference is not a matter of scientific theories always being true and pseudo-scientific theories always being false. The important difference seems to be in which approach gives better logical justification for knowledge claims. A pseudo-science may make you feel like you've got a good picture of how the world works, but you could well be wrong about it.
If a scientific picture of the world is wrong, that hard-headed scientific attitude means the chances are good that we'll find out we're wrong -- one of those tests of our hypotheses will turn up the data that falsifies them -- and switch to a different picture. A few details are important to watch here. The first is the distinction between a claim that is falsifiable and a claim that has been falsified. Popper says that scientific claims are falsifiable and pseudo-scientific claims are not.
A claim that has been falsified demonstrated to be false is obviously a falsifiable claim because, by golly, it's been falsified. Once a claim has been falsified, Popper says the right thing to do is let it go and move on to a different falsifiable claim. However, it's not that the claim shouldn't have been a part of science in the first place. So, the claim that the planets travel in circular orbits wasn't an inherently unscientific claim.
Indeed, because it could be falsified by observations, it is just the kind of claim scientists should work with. But, once the observations show that this claim is false, scientists retire it and replace it with a different falsifiable claim. This detail is important! Little or no experimentation. Conflicting evidence is ignored, excused, or hidden.
The original idea is never abandoned, whatever the evidence. Based on well-established, repeating patterns and regularities in nature. Focuses, without skepticism, on alleged exceptions, errors, anomalies, and strange events. Reproducible results are required of experiments. In case of failure, no excuses are acceptable. Results cannot be reproduced or verified.
Excuses are freely invented to explain the failure of any scientific test. Personal stories or testimonials are not accepted as evidence. Personal stories or testimonials are relied upon for evidence.
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